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1. Introduction  
Cyber threats appear in different forms and present different levels of seriousness. Whereas a 
cyber-attack amounting to armed attack is perhaps the most serious threat emanating from 
cyberspace, the probability of such an attack happening is quite low. Yet, legal commentators 
have focused their attention almost exclusively on such attacks and discussed how the rules 
on the use of force found in the United Nations (UN) Charter and in customary law apply to 
such attacks. 1  Although low-intensity cyber operations are more frequent, the legal 
framework that applies to them has not been fully explored.2 Low-intensity cyber operations 
refer to cyber operations amounting to a use of force below the threshold of an armed attack 
as well as to cyber operations below the use of force threshold. Whether low-intensity cyber 
operations constitute uses of force depends on the harm they cause in the sense of material 
damage, human injury and loss or loss of functionality.3  
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1
 See for example The Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2013). 
2
 :LWK WKH H[FHSWLRQ RI 0 1 6FKPLWW µ³%HORZ WKH 7KUHVKROG´ &\EHU 2SHUDWLRQV 7KH &RXQWHUPHDVXUHV
5HVSRQVH 2SWLRQ DQG ,QWHUQDWLRQDO /DZ¶ forthcoming in 54 Va. JIL (2014) available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2353898 
3
 Tallinn Manual, supra QRWH5XOH016FKPLWW µ&RPSXWHU1HWZRUN$WWDFNDQG WKH8VHRI)RUFH LQ
,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ7KRXJKWVRQD1RUPDWLYH)UDPHZRUN¶&ROXP-7UDQVQDW¶O/. (1999) p. 885, at pp. 909±
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This article will focus on countermeasures as acceptable responses to low level cyber 
operations and examine the legal framework within which countermeasures operate.  
The article proceeds thus as follows. Part 2 will provide an account of the genealogy of 
countermeasures and explain the legal regime within which they operate. This is very 
important because, although the term countermeasures is a recent invention having specific 
legal connotations, the normative and legal history of countermeasures is quite rich and 
instructive. Identifying the target of countermeasures is critical not only for the effectiveness 
but also for the lawfulness of countermeasures, therefore Part 3 will examine the standards 
according to which low level cyber operations can be attributed to a State or to a non-State 
actor. Part 4 will explore the scope of the principle of proportionality in the context of 
countermeasures whereas Part 5 will examine the availability of third party countermeasures 
against low-intensity cyber operations and consider the legal effects of countermeasures on 
third parties.  
 
2. Genealogy of Countermeasures  
Countermeasures are unilateral and decentralised mechanisms of enforcing international law 
in view of WKH ODWWHU¶V ZHDN HQIRUFHPHQW PHFKDQLVPV4 Their legality is premised on three 
factors: (i) the existence of a prior wrongful act; (ii) the inability or unwillingness of the 
wrong-doer to redress the situation; (iii) the proportionality of the measure.5  
                                                 
4
 Institut de Droit International, Session de Paris 1934, Régime de répresailles en temps de paix, Article 1; H. 
Kelsen, Principles of International Law (Rinehart & Company, New York, 1952)  p. 23; A. Cassese, 
International Law, 2nd edition (Oxford University Press, 2005) p. 299; J. Crawford, The International Law 
&RPPLVVLRQ¶V$UWLFOHVRQ6WDWH5HVSRQVLELOLW\ (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001) p. 281. 
5
 Article 22 ARSIWA and commentary in Crawford, ibid., pp. 168±169. *DEþLNRYR-Nagymaros Project 
(Hungary/Slovakia), Judgment, [1997] ICJ Rep. 7, para. 83. 
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Countermeasures are the modern incarnation of reprisals which as a concept and activity has 
a long pedigree. 6  $V LW ZDV VDLG UHSULVDOV ³H[LVWHG ZHOO EHIRUH ODZ QHHGOHVV WR VD\
international law. The paradox of international law as a legal order is that it allowed reprisals 
LQWR WKH OHJDO V\VWHP LWVHOI´7 The locus classicus of the law of reprisals is the Naulilaa 
arbitration of 1928. The case concerned forcible action against Portuguese forts and posts in 
Angola, following the killing and wounding of German officers by Portuguese soldiers.8 
Reprisals were defined there DV µan act of self-help on the part of the injured states, 
responding after an unsatisfied demand to an act contrary to international law on the part of 
the offending State . . . . They would be illegal if a previous act contrary to international law 
had not furnished the reason for them. They aim to impose on the offending State reparation 
for the offense or the return to legality in avoidance of new offenses.¶9 
 
Whereas traditionally forcible and non-forcible reprisals were treated as a single category10 
that could apply invariably to violations of international law regardless of whether such 
violations involved the use of force, arbitral awards,11  the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ)12 and later the International Law Commission (ILC) in its codification of the law of 
international responsibility conceptualised countermeasures as peaceful responses to 
violations of international law and by doing so they distinguished countermeasures from 
reprisals. As stated in Article 50 of the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
                                                 
6
 05XIIHUWµ5HSULVDOV¶LQMax Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2012) pp. 927±930. 
7
 E. Zoller, Peacetime Unilateral Remedies: An Analysis of Countermeasures (Transnational Publishers, Dobbs 
Ferry, NY, 1984) p. 35 
8
 Naulilaa Incident Arbitration Decision (Port. v. Ger) 2 RIAA (1928) p. 1011. 
9
 Ibid, 1017-1028 
10
 O. Y. Elagab, The Legality of Non-Forcible Counter-Measures in International  Law  (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 1988) p. 85. 
11
 Case concerning the Air Service Agreement of 27 March 1946 between the United States of America and 
France, decision of 9 December 1978, R.I.A.A., vol. XVIII, 416, para. 80. 
12
 Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, [1980] ICJ Rep. 14, para. 53; Case 
Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of 
America), Judgment of 27 June 1986, [1986] ICJ Rep. 14 ,  para. 291; *DEþLNRYR-Nagymaros Project, supra 
note 8, para. 80 
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Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA), countermeasures should not affect the prohibition of the threat or 
use of force.13 The modern concept of countermeasures thus incorporates the peaceful part of 
the older concept of reprisals.14  
Yet, acFRUGLQJWRWKH,/&³TXHVWLRQVFRQFHUQLQJWKH XVHRIIRUFHLQLQWHUQDWLRQDOUHODWLRQV«
DUHJRYHUQHGE\WKHUHOHYDQWSULPDU\UXOHV´15 One may thus say that forcible reprisals have 
been consigned to the use of force regime which is separate from the law of statre 
responsibility. The ILC has not offered any views as to the lawfulness of forcible reprisals 
according to the primary rules on the use of force, so the immediate task is to ascertain their 
current legal status. In order to do this, it is important to explain the nature and characteristics 
of the use of force regime and that of international responsibility and also take into 
consideration any relevant State practice and opinio juris. 
As was said, countermeasures are an institution of the law of international responsibility. This 
regime is constructed around the distinction between primary and secondary rules.16 Primary 
rules identify the international law obligations incumbent upon the subjects of international 
law whereas secondary rules identify the legal consequences to be derived from violations of 
primary rules. The law of international responsibility contains secondary rules, that is, rules 
on the consequences of wrongful conduct and the modalities according to which 
responsibility can be engaged. Moreover, the law of international responsibility belongs to 
the international law of peace; it is about the peaceful enforcement of international law and 
the peaceful resolution of disputes. Thus, countermeasures as part of the law of international 
responsibility aim at enforcing international obligations and effectuating international 
responsibility through peaceful means.  
 
                                                 
13
 D. AllanGµ7KH'HILQLWLRQRI&RXQWHUPHDVXUHV¶ in J. Crawford, A. Pellet and S. Olleson (eds.), The Law of 
International Responsibility (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010) p. 1127, at p. 1130. 
14
 Crawford, supra note 7, 281, para. 3. 
15
 Ibid., p. 282, para. 3. 
16
 Ibid., pp. 14±15. 
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Forcible reprisals operate within the use of force regime.17 This regime contains primary rules 
regulating the use of force in international relations. It consists of the UN law and the 
customary law on the use of force. The two sources of the law on the use of force interact but 
exist alongside each other. 18 Central to both branches is the prohibition of the unilateral use 
of force and the recognition that force can be used by way of self-defence in response to an 
armed attack.19 An armed attack is a grave use of force defined as such by its scale and 
effects.20 The UN law on the use of force does not however contain any rule on counterforce 
against uses of force below the threshold of an armed attack. There is no congruence in other 
words between the prohibition of the use of force in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and self-
defence in Article 51 of the UN Charter. In the Nicaragua FDVHWKH,&-VSRNHRI³PHDVXUHV
which do not cRQVWLWXWH DQ DUPHG DWWDFN EXW PD\ QHYHUWKHOHVV LQYROYH D XVH RI IRUFH´21 
against which the victim State can take proportional countermeasures but it did not provide 
any clarification as to whether such measures may also involve the use of force. It has been 
contended that such measures should not involve the use of force because, in the post-Charter 
era, any use of force other than in self-defence is prohibited.22 It has also been contended that 
the prohibition of forcible reactions to low-intensity uses of force exists in order to prevent 
                                                 
17
 Ibid.SSDUD³4XHVWLRQVFRQFHUQLQJWKHXVHRIIRUFHLQLQWHUQDWLRQDOUHODWLRQV«DUHJRYHUQHGE\WKH
UHOHYDQWSULPDU\UXOHV´ 
18
 Nicaragua case, supra note 11, paras. 175±178. 
19
 Article 2(4) and Article 51 UN Charter.  
20
 Nicaragua case, supra note 11, paras. 195, 210; Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. 
United States of America), [2003] I.C.J. Rep. 161, paras. 51, 64, 77; Legal Consequences of the Construction of 
a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, Advisory Opinion of 9 
July 2004, [2004] ICJ Rep. 136, para. 139; Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo 
(Democratic Republic of Congo v. Uganda) [2005] ICJ Rep., para. 147  
21
 Nicaragua case, supra note 11, para. 210. 
22
 Article 2(4) UN Charter; Tallinn Manual, supra note 1, Rule 11, para. 11 and Rule 9; I. Brownlie, 
International Law and the Use of Force by States (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1963) pp. 223, 281, 348, 
431; B. Simma (ed.), The Charter of the United Nations, A Commentary, 2nd edition, vol. 1 (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2002) p. 794; Declaration Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in 
Accordance with the UN Charter, General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV), 24 October 1970; Declaration on 
the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of States, General Assembly 
Resolution 36/103, 9 December 1981, Section II(c); Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 
Advisory Opinion, 8 July 1996, [1996] ICJ Rep. 227, para. 46. 
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further escalation of the dispute. However, in reality, if States are allowed to respond to low-
intensity operations amounting to a use of force through peaceful means only, this may not 
provide them with adequate redress whereas offending States or non-state actors can use 
force more frequently when the costs to them are minimal.  
It is because of the imbalance in the legal regulation of force and counterforce in the UN 
Charter and the serious implications such a situation has on States that forcible reprisals 
continue to have an enduring appeal even in the post-Charter period. For example, after a 
detailed study of State practice concluded in 1970, Bowett came to the conclusion that there 
is a trend according to which reprisals may be de jure illegal but accepted de facto.23 Since 
then, reprisals acquired a greater degree of legal acceptability in the context of terrorism 
where criticisms centre around issues of proportionality24 or evidence and not around the 
legal entitlement itself.25 The need of equivalent reaction to low-intensity uses of force has 
also been recognised by certain ICJ judges. In the Oil Platforms case, Judge Simma and 
-XGJH .RRLMPDQV LQ WKHLU 6HSDUDWH 2SLQLRQV ZHUH RI WKH RSLQLRQ WKDW µSURSRUWLRQDO
countermeaVXUHV¶RIDPLOLWDU\QDWXUHFRXOGEHWDNHQDJDLQVWXVHVRIIRUFHEHORZWKHDUPHG
attack threshold.26 In the same vein but in the cyber context, the minority view as recorded in 
the Tallinn Manual was that a State can resort to forcible reprisals.27 
It is subPLWWHGLQOLJKWRIWKHDERYHWKDWIRUFLEOHUHSULVDOVKDYHDSODFHLQ6WDWHV¶SUDFWLFHHYHQ
if the vocabulary used is more nuanced. To explain, States often use the self-defence 
language when they take forcible action against uses of forces below the threshold of an 
                                                 
23
 ':%RZHWWµ5HSULVDOV,QYROYLQJ5HFRXUVHWR$UPHG)RUFH¶AJIL (1972) p. 1. 
24
 % /HYHQIHOG µ,VUDHO &RXQWHU-Fedayeen Tactics in Lebanon: Self-Defence and Reprisal under Modern 
International /DZ¶Col JTL (1982) p. 1, at p. 35. With regard to the Israeli action in Gaza see SC Res. 1860 
:LWK UHJDUG WR ,VUDHO¶VDFWLRQ LQ6\ULD LQ see statements in the Security Council S/PV.5488 (13 
July 2006). 
25
 93 AJIL (1999) pp. 161±167. 
26
 Dis. Op. Simma in Case Concerning Oil Platforms, supra note 19, para.15. Judge Koojmans is rather 
noncommittal. Dis. Op. Koojmans, ibid., paras. 52 and 62 
27
 Tallinn Manual, supra note 1, Rule 9, para. 5. 
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armed attack. This may be explained by the fact that certain States such as the United States 
do not make a distinction between a use of force and an armed attack but instead treat all uses 
of force irrespective of gravity as armed attacks triggering the right to self-defence. It is 
however interesting to follow the justification offered by the United States for their action in 
Sudan and Afghanistan following the bombing of their embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 
1998. Although they invoked self-defence, the reasoning is more akin to reprisals in that it 
invoked the wrongfulness of the prior use of force, the failed request for redress, the 
proportionality of the action and the lack of effective alternatives.28According to the US 
Ambassador to the United Nations:  
[T]he United States of America has exercised its right of self-defence in responding to a series of 
armed attacks against United States embassies and United States nationals. My Government has 
obtained convincing information from a variety of reliable sources that the organization of Usama Bin 
Ladin is responsible for the devastating bombings on 7 August 1998 of the United States embassies in 
1DLURELDQG'DU(V6DODDP«7KH%LQ/DGLQRUJDQL]DWLRQPDLQWDLQVDQH[WHQVLYHQHWZRUNRIFDPSV
arsenals and training and supply facilities in Afghanistan, and support facilities in Sudan, which have 
EHHQDQGDUHEHLQJXVHG WRPRXQW WHUURULVW DWWDFNVDJDLQVW$PHULFDQ WDUJHWV«,Q UHVSRQVH WR WKHVH
terrorist attacks, and to prevent and deter their continuation, United States armed forces today struck at 
a series of camps and installations used by the Bin Ladin organization to support terrorist actions 
against the United States and other countries. In particular, United States forces struck a facility being 
used to produce chemical weapons in the Sudan and terrorist training and basing camps in Afghanistan. 
These attacks were carried out only after repeated efforts to convince the Government of the Sudan and 
the Taliban regime in Afghanistan to shut these terrorist activities down and to cease their cooperation 
with the Bin Ladin organization.29  
                                                 
28
 It should be recalled that the attacks on the Embassy did not satisfy the criteria of an armed attack as 
pronounced by the ICJ in the Nicaragua case and accepted in customary international law although, as was said, 
the US does not make such a distinction. 
29
 Letter dated 20 August 1998 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the 
United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/1998/780 (20 August 1998). 
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The same can be said with regard to the 1986 US raids in Libya in response to a terrorist 
attack in West Berlin which caused the killing of a US serviceman. Although the action was 
justified under the self-defence rubric, it is closer to reprisal even if it was disproportionate in 
its execution.30  
Often the term defensive reprisals31 is used to describe proportional counterforce to prior uses 
of force with the explanation that, whereas reprisals are punitive and retributive in character, 
defensive reprisals are purely defensive. It should be noted however that it is difficult to 
distinguish reprisals from self-defence on that basis because both reprisals and self-defence 
may have a retaliatory element or be defensive by preventing future attacks.32  Although 
reprisals share a lot in common with self-GHIHQFH DQ\ µQRUPDWLYH GULIW¶ WR VWUHWFK WKH
meaning of self-defence is unnecessary.33 
In the light of what was said above, it is submitted that a State can respond to low-intensity 
cyber operations which amount to a use of force by taking forcible reprisals. However, it 
should be stressed that the use of force involved in such a cyber operation should reach a 
certain level significance in order to justify a reprisal action.34 If the forcible cyber operation 
does not satisfy the de minimis threshold or does not qualitatively constitute a use of force, 
the victim State can only take countermeasures, that is, non-forcible measures.  
                                                 
30
 G. B. Roberts, µSelf-Help In Combatting State-6SRQVRUHG7HUURULVP6HOI'HIHQVHDQG3HDFHWLPH5HSULVDOV¶
19 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. (1987) p. 243, at pp. 286±288. 
31
 Y. Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence, 5th edition (Cambridge University Press, 2011) pp. 244±255; 
:92¶%ULHQµReprisals, Deterrence and Self-'HIHQVHLQ&RXQWHUWHUURU2SHUDWLRQV¶, 30 9D-,QW¶O/ (1990) 
p. 421, at p. 426.  
32
 Bowett, supra QRWHS57XFNHUµ5HSULVDOVDQG6HOI-'HIHQVH7KH&XVWRPDU\/DZ¶AJIL (1972) p. 
586. 
33
 ' %HWKOHKHP µ,QWHUQDWLRQDO /DZ DQG WKH 8VH RI )RUFH WKH /DZ DV LW LV DQG DV LW 6KRXOG %H¶ ZULWWHQ
evidence to the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs- Minutes of Evidence, 8 June 2004), para. 21 available at: 
<www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/cmselect/cmfaff/441/4060808.htm>. 
34
 Tallinn Manual, supra note 1, Rule 11, paras 1, 6±7. 
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A related and quite interesting question in the cyber context is whether low-intensity cyber 
operations that do not cause material destruction or human injury and loss constitute uses of 
force. This issue has been debated quite extensively, and it seems that there is increased 
acceptance of the view that cyber operations that significantly disrupt the functionality of a 
6WDWH¶V FULWLFDO QDWLRQDO LQIUDVWUXFWXUH DUH HTXLYDOHQW WR D XVH RI IRUFH 35 A State can thus 
resort to forcible reprisals in response to such cyber operations, but if the opposite view that 
such operations are not uses of force is accepted, the victim State can resort to 
countermeasures. 
It goes without saying that the lawfulness of the countermeasure or reprisal is premised on 
the existence of a prior breach of an international obligation owned to the injured State. I will 
not enumerate here all the obligations that low-intensity cyber operations may breach, but I 
will only indicatively mention the obligation enshrined in the UN Charter and in customary 
ODZQRWWRXVHIRUFHWKHFXVWRPDU\ODZREOLJDWLRQQRWWRLQWHUYHQHLQD6WDWH¶VDIIDLUVRUWKH
FXVWRPDU\ODZREOLJDWLRQWRUHVSHFWD6WDWH¶VVRYHUHLJQW\ 
If States can resort to countermeasures or reprisals in response to low-intensity cyber 
operations, identifying the target of their action is crucial. As the ICJ said in relation to 
countermeasures, they must be directed against the State that is responsible for the wrongful 
act.36 This brings into the fore the issue of attribution which will be examined in the next 
section.  
 
 
3. Attribution in Low-intensity Cyber Operations 
                                                 
35
 W. G. Sharp, Cyberspace and the Use of Force (Aegis Research cooperation, Falls Church, 1999) pp.  129 et 
seq(7 -HQVHQ µ&RPSXWHU$WWDFNVRQ&ULWLFDO6WDWH ,QIUDVWUXFWXUH $8VHRI)RUFH ,QYRNLQJ WKH 5LJKW RI
Self-'HIHQFH¶6WDQ-,QW¶O/(2002) p. 207, at pp. 221±229. Contra <'LQVWHLQµ&RPSXWHU1HWZRUN$WWDFN
and Self-'HIHQFH¶  LQ016FKPLWWDQG%72¶'RQQHOOComputer Network Attack and International Law 
(Naval War College, 2002)  at p. 105 
36
 *DEþLNRYR-Nagymaros Project, supra note 8,  para. 83; ARSIWA, p. 169. 
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Attribution is the assignment of an act to a particular actor. Identifying the originator of a 
cyber operation is a very difficult exercise because of the anonymity, the speed and the multi-
stage character of such operations. It has been stated elsewhere that attribution has a 
technical, a political and a legal aspect. 37  The legal aspect of attribution refers to the 
international law criteria according to which acts can be attributed to a State.  
As far as countermeasures are concerned, attribution takes place according to the standards 
contained in the law of international responsibility. Accordingly, a low-intensity cyber 
operation will be attributed to a State if it is mounted by an organ of that State,38 by a person 
or entity exercising governmental authority,39 or by a State organ placed at the disposal of 
another State.40 It will also be attributed to a State if it is mounted by a person or a group of 
persons under the direction or control of that State, by an insurrectional movement that 
becomes the government of the State41 or by a person or a group of persons acting in default 
of official authorities. It will finally be attributed to a State if the latter adopts it as its own.42 
In all of these cases, the victim State can take countermeasures against the wrongdoing State 
but it should be noted that countermeasures do not need to be qualitatively equivalent. A 
State may thus respond to a wrongful low-intensity cyber operation by taking cyber or 
physical countermeasures.  
Reprisals as was said belong to the use of force regime and attribution will take place 
DFFRUGLQJWRWKDWUHJLPH¶VVWDQGDUGV7KHVHVWDQGDUGVKDYHQRWEHHQFRGLILHGLQDQ\VSHFLILF
document but international lawyers often apply in toto the attribution standards found in the 
law of international responsibility to the use of force.43 This is not entirely correct because 
                                                 
37
 1 7VDJRXULDV µ&\EHUDWWDFNV 6HOI-GHIHQFH DQG WKH 3UREOHP RI $WWULEXWLRQ¶  Journal of Conflict and 
Security Law (2012) pp. 229±245. 
38
 Article 4 ARSIWA. 
39
 Article 5 ARSIWA. 
40
 Article 6 ARSIWA. 
41
 Article 10 ARSIWA. 
42
 Article 11 ARSIWA. 
43
 Tallinn Manual, supra note 1, Rule 6. 
11 
 
not all of these standards correspond to the needs and particularities of the use of force 
regime. As a matter of fact the ICJ has accepted in the Bosnia Genocide case that different 
UHJLPHVPD\KDYHGLIIHUHQWDWWULEXWLRQFULWHULD$V LWVDLG³ORJLFGRHVQRW UHTXLUH WKHVDPH
test to be adopted in resolving the two issues which are very dLIIHUHQWLQQDWXUH´44  This does 
not mean that the two regimes cannot share certain common standards. Where the use of 
force regime diverges from that of international responsibility is with regard to the level of 
control needed in order to attribute a use of force to a State. Whereas in the law of 
international responsibility effective control is the applicable standard as held by the ICJ in 
the  Nicaragua case45 and was later confirmed in Bosnia Genocide case,46 in the use of force 
regime the effective control standard can apply to individuals and unorganised groups 
whereas for organised groups the overall control criterion is more useful. The overall control 
was introduced by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in 
the 7DGLü FDVH$FFRUGLQJ WR WKH ,&7<D6WDWH³ZLHOGVRYHUDOO FRQWURORYHU WKHJURXSQRW
only by equipping and financing the group, but also by coordinating or helping in the general 
SODQQLQJRI LWVPLOLWDU\DFWLYLW\´DQG LQ WKDWFDVH³LW LVQRWQHFHVVDU\ WKDW LQDGGLWLRQ WKH
State should also issue, either to the head or to members of the group, instructions for the 
FRPPLVVLRQ RI VSHFLILF DFWV FRQWUDU\ WR LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ´47 Overall control covers cases 
where a State exerts general influence over a group and its activities and is particularly 
suitable in the cyber context where States and cyber groups may collude in a variety of 
                                                 
44
 Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia), [2007] ICJ Rep. 43, paras. 404±405. 
45
 Article 8 ARSIWA; Nicaragua case, supra note 11, paras. 116±117; Bosnia Genocide case, ibid., para. 398. 
46
 Bosnia Genocide case, ibid., paras. 402±406.  
47
 7DGLüAppeal, para. 131. 
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different ways. As the ICJ said in another instance when discussing attribution, it is important 
WR³JUDVSWKHUHDOLW\RIWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQWKHSHUVRQWDNLQJDFWLRQDQGWKHVWDWH´48  
In addition to overall control, toleration of non-State actors and of their harmful activities  or 
and unwillingness to suppress their harmful activities are two other standards employed by 
the use of force regime.49 They have been introduced in order to respond to the complexities 
RI 6WDWH FROOXVLRQ ZLWK WHUURULVWV RU WHUURULVW RUJDQLVDWLRQV 7KH µ¶ DWWDFNV ZHUH WKH
catalyst in introducing the criterion of toleration and unwillingness to the use of force regime. 
The US for example used force by way of self-defence against Afghanistan because it 
³DOORZ>HG@ « SDUWV RI$IJKDQLVWDQ LW FRQWUROV WR EH XVHG E\ WKLV RUJDQL]DWLRQ DV D EDVH RI
operation. Despite every effort by the United States and the international community, the 
7DOLEDQ UHJLPH KDV UHIXVHG WR FKDQJH LWV SROLF\´ 50  This was endorsed by the Security 
Council in Resolutions 1368 (2001) and 1373 (2001). Likewise, the US action in Sudan and 
Afghanistan in 1998 was in reaction to prior uses of force by a non-State actor hosted and 
tolerated by these States. In the Congo v. Uganda case, the ICJ seems to have recognised 
toleration as a criterion for attributing uses of force to a State.51 Consequently, if a State 
tolerates non-State actors that engage in forcible cyber activities against other States or is 
unwilling to suppress such activities, the resulting use of force will be attributed to that State.   
 
                                                 
48
 Bosnia Genocide, supra note 43, para. 392. 
49
 Simma, supra note 24, p. 802. 
50
 Letter dated 7 October 2001 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United 
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 Congo v. Uganda, supra note 22, para. 301. 
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It follows from the above that only when the State is not implicated at all in the forcible cyber 
activities of non-State actors or when the State is unable to control their activities that the use 
of force will not be attributed to that State. The immediate question is whether the victim 
State can take reprisal action against the non-State actor. The fact that the cyber operation 
was mounted by a non-State actor does not change its character as a use of force and does not 
remove the injury that has caused on the victim State. However, the crucial question is 
whether the non-State actor has breached any obligation towards the victim State. In 
international law, the prohibition not to use force formally applies to the relations between 
States only. Non-State actors are not bound by the obligation not to use force. Consequently, 
one of the reprisal conditions ±that there should be a breach of an international obligation ± is 
not met. It should be recalled that, in contrast to self-defence whose legality as will be 
explained later is premised on a factual occurrence (an armed attack), reprisals have 
maintained their normative link to an antecedent illegality. Their legality in other words is 
premised not on a factual situation ± the use of force ± but on a legal one: the violation of the 
obligation not to use force. 
At this stage, it will be useful to remind ourselves of how the law of self-defence evolved in 
this respect. Nowadays WKHUH LV LQFUHDVHG DFFHSWDQFH RI D 6WDWH¶V ULJKW WR WDNH GLUHFW VHOI-
defence action against non-State actors.52  This is supported by the fact that the modern 
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formulation of self-defence as enshrined in Article 51 of the UN Charter has been 
normatively decoupled from the illegality of the initial action. To explain, normatively, the 
use of force by way of self-defence is a reaction to a prior violation of international law 
LQYROYLQJWKHXVHRIIRUFH$V$JRSXWLW³DFWLQJLQVHOI-defence means responding by force to 
forcible wrongful action carried out by another, and the only reason why such a response is 
not itself ZURQJIXOLVWKDWWKHDFWLRQZKLFKSURYRNHGLWZDVZURQJIXO´53 That initial violation 
³LV QRW RQO\ DQ H[WUHPHO\ VHULRXV RQH EXW LV DOVR RI D YHU\ VSHFLDO NLQG´54 justifying thus 
forcible reaction. In the process, the unlawfulness of the prior use of force lost its significance 
in the legal construction of self-defence which is now premised on the existence of a prior 
factual situation in the form of an armed attack. Under this construction, the victim State can 
use force by way of self-defence directly against non-State actors because the self-defence 
action is justified by the existence of a prior armed attack and not by the existence of a prior 
violation incumbent on the non-State actor not to use force, an obligation which, as was said, 
does not extend to non-State actors according to current international law. Moreover, the 
LQFLGHQWDOEUHDFKRI WKHKRVW6WDWH¶V VRYHUHLJQW\ ZKHQ WKHYLFWLP6WDWHDFWV LQ VHOI-defence 
against the non-State actor hosted by that State is exonerated since, according to the law of 
State responsibility, self-defence is also a secondary rule and as such precludes the 
wrongfulness of the breach.55 
It transpires from the precedent discussion that the consequences of a formalistic approach to 
the use of force by non-State actors are quite serious because these actors can use force 
against States with relative impunity.  As a matter of fact, low-intensity cyber operations by 
                                                                                                                                                        
states can be the authors of an armed attack. See Palestinian Wall Advisory Opinion, supra note 22, para. 139; 
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non-State actors are more probable due to the limited resources required whereas an armed 
attack by a non-State actor is perhaps a remote possibility.  
It is for this reason that I have argued elsewhere that, in view of the importance of the rule on 
the non-use of force and the ability and willingness of non-State actors to use force, the 
prohibition of the use of force should extend to non-State actors.56 They should become 
DGGUHVVHHV RI WKH UXOH EHFDXVH RI WKHLU µDFWRUQHVV¶ LQ WKH LQWHUQDWLRQDO DUHQD ,I WKLV
interpretation of the rule on the non-use of force is accepted, a low-intensity cyber operation 
by a non-State actor involving the use of force will be a breach of its obligation towards the 
victim State. However, even in this case, the State cannot respond by taking direct reprisal 
action against the non-State actor because of the absence of an established rule or of 
supporting practice. Moreover, the acting 6WDWH ZLOO YLRODWH WKH KRVW 6WDWH¶V VRYHUHLJQW\ D
wrongful act that cannot be exonerated. It should be recalled that reprisals, as opposed to 
countermeasures, are not circumstances precluding wrongfulness.  
Thus, with regard to low-intensity cyber operations by non-State actors amounting to a use of 
force, the victim State cannot target them directly with reprisals either because relevant 
international law obligations do not extend to non-State actors or because the reprisal action, 
even if it is in response to a prior breach by the non-State actor of its obligation not to use 
force, will violate the sovereignty of the host State which is not responsible for the wrong. 
Likewise, the victim State cannot resort to countermeasures against non-State actors either 
because there is no breach of obligations by the non-State actor or because countermeasures 
should be directed against the responsible State only.  
                                                 
56
 1 7VDJRXULDV µ1RQ-6WDWH $FWRUV DQG WKH 8VH RI )RUFH¶ LQ J. '¶$VSUHPRQW HG.), Participants in the 
International Legal System: Theoretical Perspectives (Routledge, London, 2012) p. 326. 
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It transpires then that the victim State is faced with the dilemma of doing nothing and 
continue to be exposed to uses of force by non-State actors or respond in kind and expose 
itself to reprisals or countermeasures by the host State whose rights have been violated. 
International law does not provide any answer to the dilemma but any answer will be 
political. The only possibility that exists is for the Security Council to impose collective 
sanctions on non-State actors. The Security Council has such power when it determines that 
there is a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or an act of aggression57 and it has 
imposed sanctions on non-State actors in the past.58 Additionally, the Security Council can 
take enforcement action.   
 
4. Proportionality in Countermeasures 
Proportionality is an essential condition in the law of countermeasures as well as of reprisals. 
Because countermeasures and reprisals are decentralised mechanisms of enforcing 
international law, proportionality plays a restraining function by curbing excessive responses 
because, as was observed b\ RQH RI WKH ,/& 5DSSRUWHXUV ³>D@lthough less dramatic and 
harmful, such measures can be equally detrimental to the preservation of friendly relations 
DQGWKHGHYHORSPHQWRIFRRSHUDWLRQDPRQJ6WDWHV´59 Proportionality in other words mediates 
between unilateralism and legality. However, assessing proportionality is a rather difficult 
exercise. This is evident by the fact that very often it is the proportionality of 
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countermeasures or reprisals that has been disputed even if their legality or legitimacy has 
been accepted.  
One way of measuring proportionality is by establishing a degree of equivalence between the 
initial breach and the response. As the Arbitral Tribunal opined in the Naulilaa FDVH³[e]ven 
if one admits that international law does not require that reprisals be measured approximately 
by the offence, one must certainly consider as excessive, and consequently illicit, reprisals 
RXWRIDOOSURSRUWLRQWRWKHDFWZKLFKKDVPRWLYDWHGWKHP´60 It was on that basis that it opined 
that the German reprisals were disproportionate.  
Article 51 ARSIWA is more flexible when it comes to determining the proportionality of 
countermeasures. According to this provision, FRXQWHUPHDVXUHVVKRXOGEH³FRPPHQVXUDWHWR
the injury suffered and take into account the gravity of the wrongful act and the rights in 
TXHVWLRQ´)URPWKDWLWDSSHDUVWKDWTXDQWLWDWLYHDVZHOODVTXDOLWDWLYHIDFWRUV61 relating to the 
injured State, the wrongdoing State, third States and perhaps individuals affected but not 
injured by the countermeasure are taken into consideration. 
For example, if a Denial of Service Attack (DDSA) on the on-line banking system of a State 
affects the on-line banking systems of neighbouring countries, this should be taken into 
account by the State taking countermeasures as should the effects of the DDSA on 
individuals. It should be remembered however that the main unit of assessment is the injury 
suffered and this is a delimiting factor when assessing the proportionality of 
countermeasures.  
Is this however correct? Proportionality is a general principle of law and therefore of 
international law and in broad terms implies a two prong test: first, whether the measure 
                                                 
60
 Naulilaa Incident Arbitration, supra note 6, p. 1028. 
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pursues a legitimate aim and, secondly, whether the measure and the means used are 
excessive or unnecessary in relation to the objective being pursued.62  
What is important therefore is to identify first the purpose of the countermeasure because that 
will be the primary referent point against which proportionality will be assessed. Article 49 
ARSIWA defines the purpose of countermeasures in instrumental terms, namely, to induce a 
State to cease its wrongful conduct and provide reparation. If reparation is the objective of 
countermeasures, then the injury is the primary unit for assessing the proportionality of the 
countermeasure but if inducing compliance is also one of its aims, it may involve a higher 
amount of compulsion compared to the injury. This immediately defies the injury ± response 
equivalence embodied in Article 51 ARSIWA. In the Air Service Agreement arbitration 
between the US and France, the tribunal concluded that the US countermeasures were not 
GLVSURSRUWLRQDWHHYHQLI WKHLUVHYHULW\ZDVJUHDWHUFRPSDUHGWR)UDQFH¶VLQLWLDODFWLRQ$VLW
ZDVREVHUYHG³the real insight of the Air Service Agreement award was that there had to be a 
permissible level of escalation in response to illegal acts, or else the malefactor would simply 
QRWUHJDUGWKHWKUHDWVPDGHE\WKHLQMXUHGVWDWHDVFUHGLEOH´63 
The ARSIWA seem to subordinate the purpose of countermeasures to the proportionality 
calculus when it asserts that proportionality is a limitation even on measures which may be 
justified under Article 49 and continues by saying that a disproportionate measure may well 
be judged as not being necessary to induce compliance.64 7KH,/&¶VSRVLWLRQSHUKDSVVWHPV
from its fear ±not at all unreasonable ± that countermeasures may be abused. Moreover, even 
if the ILC narrowed down the purposes of countermeasures, it must have been aware of the 
                                                 
62
 Sunday Times v. United Kingdom (1979) 2 EHRR 245; Case C-331/88 Fedesa [1990] ECR I-4023 at 4063; 
³WKHSULQFLSOHRISURSRUWLRQDOLW\«UHTXLUHVWKDWPHDVXUHV«GR not exceed the limits of what is appropriate and 
necessary in order to attain the objectives legitimately pursued by the legislation in question when there is a 
choice between several appropriate measures recourse must be had to the least onerous, and the disadvantage 
casued are otto be disproportionDWHWRWKHDLPVSXUVXHG´.  
63
 D. -%HGHUPDQµ&RXQWHULQWXLWLQJ&RXQWHUPHDVXUHV¶, 96 AJIL (2002) p. 817, at p. 820. 
64
 Crawford, supra note 7, p. 296, para. 7. 
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fact that countermeasures have always served other purposes in addition to inducing 
compliance and receiving reparation.65 Depending on the declared or undeclared purpose of 
countermeasures, proportionality may acquire different scope. Such a graded view of 
proportionality in the context of countermeasures has been advocated for example by 
Cannizzaro. Proportionality for him has an external dimension that is about the 
appropriateness of the aim and function of the countermeasure as well as an internal one 
which is about the appropriateness of the measure in view of the result. According to 
Cannizzaro66 the external proportionality of countermeasures can be assessed against their 
normative, retributive, coercive and executive function. Countermeasures with a normative 
function aim to re-establish the legal balance of the parties involved. Countermeasures with 
retributive function aim at inflicting a certain cost on the wrongdoer. Coercive 
countermeasures aim at inducing the wrongdoer to reverse the effects of its wrongful conduct 
and to comply with its obligation. Executive countermeasures aim at wiping out the adverse 
effects of the breach and securing unilaterally the benefits that would derive from the 
infringed obligation even without the cooperation of the wrongdoing State.  
This view is shared by the present writer as far as countermeasures are concerned but it is 
also contended that a more nuanced view of proportionality is needed in the context of 
reprisals. Traditionally, reprisals have fulfilled many different purposes such as deterrence, 
protection, retribution, coercion or reparation and therefore proportionality should be 
assessed accordingly.67 In this regard it should also be noted that linking the proportionality 
of a forcible measure to its goals is prevalent in the use of force regime. To give an example, 
it is widely accepted that the use of force by way of self-defence can be quantitatively larger 
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than the initial armed attack because its aim is to repel the attack and its proportionality 
should be commensurate to its capacity to achieve that result.68  
The second test of the proportionality calculus concerns the suitability of the measure and of 
the means used to achieve the aim. Means do not necessarily need to be qualitatively similar 
to the initial act and therefore a State may respond to low-intensity cyber operations with 
cyber or physical means. That said, countermeasures should involve non-forcible measures 
whereas reprisals involve armed means.  
There are two other issues concerning proportionality that need to be mentioned. First, in the 
context of low-intensity but repeated cyber operations, proportionality may be assessed 
against the cumulative effect of said operations. Repeated cyber operations involving the use 
of force may cross the threshold of an armed attack in which case the victim State can use 
force by way of self-defence. The proportionality of the self-defence action will then be 
DVVHVVHG DJDLQVW LWV DLP DV H[SODLQHG DERYH $V $JR SXW LW ³the requirement of 
proportionality will certainly not mean that the victim State is not free to undertake a single 
armed action on a much larger scale in order to put an end to this escalating succession of 
DWWDFNV´69 Yet, even if such operations do not rise to the level of an armed attack, a State may 
react to repeated low intensity cyber operations through a single act of reprisal or through 
countermeasures whose proportionality will be assessed against the cumulative effect of the 
prior operations as well as against the aims pursued by the reprisal or countermeasure. 
Secondly, because of the fluidity of cyber operations, the lack of territorial grounding and the 
difficulties in identifying the authors of the attack, it has been suggested that reciprocal 
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countermeasures are most suitable and, perhaps, more effective in the cyber context. 70 
5HFLSURFDOFRXQWHUPHDVXUHVDUH³FRXQWHUPHDVXUHVZKLFKLQYROYHVXVSHQVLRQRISHUIRUPDQFH
of obligations towards the responsible State if such obligations correspond to, or are directly 
FRQQHFWHG ZLWK WKH REOLJDWLRQ EUHDFKHG´ DQG DFFRUGLQJ WR WKH ,/&¶V FRPPHQWDU\
³FRXQWHUPHDVXUHVDUHPRUHOLNHO\WRVDWLVI\WKHUHTXLUHPHQWVRIQHFHVVLW\DQGSURSRUWLRQDOLW\
LIWKH\DUHWDNHQLQUHODWLRQWRWKHVDPHRUFORVHO\UHODWHGREOLJDWLRQ´ 71 Whether reciprocal 
countermeasures, for example a denial of service attack (DDSA) against a previous DDSA 
would satisfy without more the proportionality criterion is conjectural and subject to many 
GLIIHUHQWIDFWRUVVXFKDVWKHH[WHQWDQGGHQVLW\RID6WDWH¶VF\EHULQIUDVWUXFWXUH72 Moreover, 
proportionality is a wider concept than reciprocity, and it is not only about the nature of the 
measure. Even in the case of reprisals where action and reaction are qualitatively similar, in 
that they are both uses of force, the proportionality calculus takes into account other criteria 
as explained in this section. 
 
5. Countermeasures by Third States and Countermeasures Affecting Third States 
Can third States take countermeasures against a State that has launched a low-intensity 
operation against another State? In principle, third States cannot take countermeasures against 
the responsible State.73 However the ILC has recognised the situation where third States can 
react to illegality. According to Article 48 ARSIWA any State other than the injured State 
can invoke the responsibility of another State if the obligation breached is owned to a group 
of States including that State and is established for the protection of a collective interest. 
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Moreover, according to Article 54 ARSIWA, any State within the meaning of Article 48 
ARSIW$FDQWDNHµODZIXOPHDVXUHV¶DJDLQVWWKHZURQJGRLQJ6WDWHWRHQVXUHFHVVDWLRQRIWKH
breach and reparation in the interest of the injured State. An example is the prohibition of the 
use of force in the UN Charter which is for the protection of a common interest that of peace.  
7KHTXHVWLRQKRZHYHULVZKHWKHUµODZIXOPHDVXUHV¶UHIHUWRFRXQWHUPHDVXUHV7KHSKUDVHLV
ambiguous, but if read in the context within which it is used, it can be reasonably inferred 
that it refers to countermeasures. The ILC was ambivalent in its terminology because it was 
not satisfied that there was sufficient State practice in this regard. It mentioned the measures 
taken by the European Union (EU) against Iraq following the invasion of Kuwait as well as 
the measures taken against Yugoslavia in view of the human rights violations committed in 
that country during the armed conflict in the 1990s. 74  A more recent example of such 
PHDVXUHV DUH WKRVH WDNHQ E\ WKH (8 LQ UHVSRQVH WR ,UDQ¶V GHYHORSPHQW RI QXFOHDU
capabilities75 EHFDXVH ³,UDQ FRntinues to refuse to comply with its international obligations 
and to fully co-operate with the IAEA to address the concerns on its nuclear programme, and 
LQVWHDGFRQWLQXHVWRYLRODWHWKRVHREOLJDWLRQV´76 <HWDFFRUGLQJWRWKH,/&¶VFRPPHQWDU\WKH
availability of countermeasures in such cases is left to the future development of international 
law because the existing practice is scarce and mainly limited to Western States.77 Against 
this, it has been argued that there is indeed sufficient practice to support the view that States 
can take countermeasures against third States when they violate obligations owned 
collectively or when they violate obligations owned to the international community and such 
practice is not confined to Western States only.78  
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Be that as it may, even if countermeasures by third States are permitted in those cases 
mentioned by Article 48 ARSIWA, this does not extend to reprisals. There is no relevant 
practice or opinio juris to support the view that third and non-injured States can resort to 
reprisals against the wrongdoing State. The only possibility of collective reaction is either on 
the basis of collective self-defence if the cyber operation rises to the level of an armed 
attack79 or collective action on the basis of Security Council authorisation.80  
Another issue that is left undecided is whether reactions to such violations by third States 
should be channelled through institutions or whether third states can act unilaterally.  The 
latter option entails risks whereas the former may stumble at multiple hurdles. 
A different issue is whether countermeasures against a responsible State which affect other 
States and breach obligations owned to those States are lawful.81 This is critical in the cyber 
context because, due to its interconnectedness, cyber countermeasures could incidentally and 
inadvertently affect third States. Although such countermeasures are lawful as far as the 
wrongdoing State is concerned, they may violate obligations owned to third States. 
Moreover, the exonerating effect of the countermeasure does not extend to third States.82  
The immediate question is whether such countermeasures become illegal ab initio and 
therefore lose their character as a countermeasure. Countermeasures with the exception of 
those referred to in Article 48 ARSIWA operate in a bilateral framework involving, on the 
one hand, the wrongdoing State that is responsible for the breach and, on the other, the 
injured State which reacts to the breach. In the situation under consideration, there are two 
sets of bilateral relations: the first is between the State responsible for the initial wrongful act 
and the injured by that act State that resorts to countermeasures and the second is between the 
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latter State and the third State injured by those countermeasure. These set of relationships 
give rise to different legal consequences if one also bears in mind that the obligations 
involved may also differ. As a result, whereas the countermeasures in the first instance are  
lawful provided of course that they satisfy all the other conditions, they are unlawful vis-à-vis 
the third State. The third but injured State may resort to countermeasures unless the 
responsible State ceases the violation and makes reparation. The reparation will cover any 
material or moral damage arising as a consequence of the act unless it has been too remote 
and unforeseeable.83  
Countermeasures may also affect the rights of individuals located in the affected third State. 
For example, they may affect among others their human rights to have access to information, 
their right to privacy or their right to freedom of expression. However, the responsible State 
does not owe them any obligation, and therefore it does not breach any of their rights. The 
responsible State does not also breach any obligation towards the third State under whose 
jurisdiction those individuals reside. The immediate question is whether the affected 
individuals have been placed under the jurisdiction of the reacting State in relation to the 
countermeasure. It should be recalled that tuman rights obligations are owned by states vis-à-
vis individuals under their jurisdiction. +XPDQ ULJKWV WUHDWLHV H[WHQG D 6WDWH¶V MXULVGLFWLRQ
extraterritorially if the State exercises authority and control over individuals.84 In so far as 
countermeasures have some physical element of authority and control, for example by 
LQMXULQJ DQ LQGLYLGXDO RQH PD\ VD\ WKDW WKH 6WDWH¶V MXULVGLFWLRQ H[WHQGV WR WKDW LQGLYLGXDO
Such authority and control may be more difficult to establish if the countermeasure is purely 
cyber, although the concept of virtual control has also been introduced.85  It has also been 
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DUJXHG WKDW H[WUDWHUULWRULDO MXULVGLFWLRQ LV EDVHG RQ D 6WDWH¶V SRVLWLYH REOLJDWLRQ WR UHVSHFW
human rights and its negative obligation to ensure respect of human rights. 86  The latter 
obligation is not territorially limited since a State can always prevent its organs or agents 
from violating human rights. Yet, even if individuals residing in a third State are placed under 
the jurisdiction of the responsible State on the grounds mentioned above, the violation of 
their rights will give rise to human rights litigation. Individuals cannot take countermeasures 
against States. It is only their State of nationality that may be able to take countermeasures in 
relation to such breaches if it exercises diplomatic protection in which case the wrongdoing 
6WDWH¶VGXWLHVDUHRZQHGQRWWRWKHLQGLYLGXDOEXWWRKHU6WDWHRIQDWLRQDOLW\ 
 
6. Conclusion  
From the preceding discussion it can be concluded that countermeasures are international law 
remedies against low-intensity cyber operations. Countermeasures are acts of self-help to 
enforce international obligations that FRPSHQVDWHIRULQWHUQDWLRQDOODZ¶V weak mechanisms of 
institutional enforcement. Yet, countermeasures conceptualized by the ILC in its Articles on 
the Responsibility of States as peaceful measures may not be able to deal effectively with 
cyber operations involving the use of force. It is for this reason that the author of this article 
is of the opinion that reprisals should attain full legal recognition in contemporary 
international law. Such a view is supported by relevant State practice as well as by academic 
and judicial opinion.  
A problem that international law constantly fails to address and by not addressing it exposes 
itself to accusations of inadequacy or even irrelevance concerns the place of non-State actors 
in international law and more particularly in the use of force regime. Although there have 
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been some developments in the area of self-defence, these development have not extended to 
countermeasures or reprisals. It thus appears that non-State actors are not independently 
bound by international law although they may be the main authors of low-intensity cyber 
operations. One way of dealing with this problem is to expand the circumstances under which 
their acts can be attributed to a State but this cannot address the problem sufficiently. It is 
therefore imperative for international law to tackle this problem directly. Another problem 
that countermeasures or reprisals in the cyber context give rise to concerns their effects on 
third States and individuals. This implicates a host of legal issues which cannot be dealt with 
solely by the law of countermeasures. It is also something that depends on advancements in 
cyber technology.  
That said, it should be noted that the problems highlighted above are not peculiar to the cyber 
context but perhaps the cyber context exacerbates any legal uncertainty that may exist and 
puts more pressure on international rules and principles.  
 
